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Abstract. In this paper we introduce a notion of fault-tolerance dis-
tance between labeled transition systems. Intuitively, this notion of dis-
tance measures the degree of fault-tolerance exhibited by a candidate
system. In practice, there are different kinds of fault-tolerance, here we
restrict ourselves to the analysis of masking fault-tolerance because it is
often a highly desirable goal for critical systems. Roughly speaking, a
system is masking fault-tolerant when it is able to completely mask the
faults, not allowing these faults to have any observable consequences for
the users. We capture masking fault-tolerance via a simulation relation,
which is accompanied by a corresponding game characterization. We en-
rich the resulting games with quantitative objectives to define the notion
of masking fault-tolerance distance. Furthermore, we investigate the ba-
sic properties of this notion of masking distance, and we prove that it
is a directed semimetric. We have implemented our approach in a proto-
type tool that automatically computes the masking distance between a
nominal system and a fault-tolerant version of it. We have used this tool
to measure the masking tolerance of multiple instances of several case
studies.
1 Introduction
Fault-tolerance allows for the construction of systems that are able to over-
come the occurrence of faults during their execution. Examples of fault-tolerant
systems can be found everywhere: communication protocols, hardware circuits,
avionic systems, cryptographic currencies, etc. So, the increasing relevance of
critical software in everyday life has led to a renewed interest in the automatic
verification of fault-tolerant properties. However, one of the main difficulties
when reasoning about these kinds of properties is given by their quantitative na-
ture, which is true even for non-probabilistic systems. A simple example is given
⋆ This work was supported by grants ANPCyT PICT-2017-3894 (RAFTSys),
secyt-unc 33620180100354CB (ARES), and the ERC Advanced Grant 695614
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by the introduction of redundancy in critical systems. This is, by far, one of the
most used techniques in fault-tolerance. In practice, it is well-known that adding
more redundancy to a system increases its reliability. Measuring this increment
is a central issue for evaluating fault-tolerant software, protocols, etc. On the
other hand, the formal characterization of fault-tolerant properties could be an
involving task, usually these properties are encoded using ad-hoc mechanisms as
part of a general design.
The usual flow for the design and verification of fault-tolerant systems con-
sists in defining a nominal model (i.e., the “fault-free” or “ideal” program) and
afterwards extending it with faulty behaviors that deviate from the normal be-
havior prescribed by the nominal model. This extended model represents the
way in which the system operates under the occurrence of faults. There are
different ways of extending the nominal model, the typical approach is fault in-
jection [18,19], that is, the automatic introduction of faults into the model. An
important property that any extended model has to satisfy is the preservation
of the normal behavior under the absence of faults. In [10], we proposed an al-
ternative formal approach for dealing with the analysis of fault-tolerance. This
approach allows for a fully automated analysis and appropriately distinguishes
faulty behaviors from normal ones. Moreover, this framework is amenable to
fault-injection. In that work, three notions of simulation relations are defined
to characterize masking, nonmasking, and failsafe fault-tolerance, as originally
defined in [13].
During the last decade, significant progress has been made towards defining
suitable metrics or distances for diverse types of quantitative models includ-
ing real-time systems [17], probabilistic models [11], and metrics for linear and
branching systems [5,7,16,21,27]. Some authors have already pointed out that
these metrics can be useful to reason about the robustness of a system, a notion
related to fault-tolerance. Particularly, in [5] the traditional notion of simulation
relation is generalized and three different simulation distances between systems
are introduced, namely correctness, coverage, and robustness. These are defined
using quantitative games with discounted-sum and mean-payoff objectives.
In this paper we introduce a notion of fault-tolerance distance between la-
belled transition systems. Intuitively, this distance measures the degree of fault-
tolerance exhibited by a candidate system. As it was mentioned above, there
exist different levels of fault-tolerance, we restrict ourselves to the analysis of
masking fault-tolerance because it is often classified as the most benign kind of
fault-tolerance and it is a highly desirable property for critical systems. Roughly
speaking, a system is masking fault-tolerant when it is able to completely mask
the faults, not allowing these faults to have any observable consequences for the
users. Formally, the system must preserve both the safety and liveness properties
of the nominal model [13]. In contrast to the robustness distance defined in [5],
which measures how many unexpected errors are tolerated by the implementa-
tion, we consider a specific collection of faults given in the implementation and
measure how many faults are tolerated by the implementation in such a way that
they can be masked by the states. We also require that the normal behavior of
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the specification has to be preserved by the implementation when no faults are
present. In this case, we have a bisimulation between the specification and the
non-faulty behavior of the implementation. Otherwise, the distance is 1. That
is, δm(N, I) = 1 if and only if the nominal model N and I\F are not bisimilar,
where I\F behaves like the implementation I where all actions in F are forbid-
den (\ is Milner’s restriction operator). Thus, we effectively distinguish between
the nominal model and its fault-tolerant version and the set of faults taken into
account.
In order to measure the degree of masking fault-tolerance of a given system,
we start characterizing masking fault-tolerance via simulation relations between
two systems as defined in [10]. The first one acting as a specification of the in-
tended behavior (i.e., nominal model) and the second one as the fault-tolerant
implementation (i.e., the extended model with faulty behavior). The existence of
a masking relation implies that the implementation masks the faults. Afterwards,
we introduce a game characterization of masking simulation and we enrich the
resulting games with quantitative objectives to define the notion ofmasking fault-
tolerance distance, where the possible values of the game belong to the interval
[0, 1]. The fault-tolerant implementation is masking fault-tolerant if the value
of the game is 0. Furthermore, the bigger the number, the farther the masking
distance between the fault-tolerant implementation and the specification. Ac-
cordingly, a bigger distance remarkably decreases fault-tolerance. Thus, for a
given nominal model N and two different fault-tolerant implementations I1 and
I2, our distance ensures that δm(N, I1) < δm(N, I2) whenever I1 tolerates more
faults than I2. We also provide a weak version of masking simulation, which
makes it possible to deal with complex systems composed of several interact-
ing components. We prove that masking distance is a directed semimetric, that
is, it satisfies two basic properties of any distance, reflexivity and the triangle
inequality.
Finally, we have implemented our approach in a tool that takes as input a
nominal model and its fault-tolerant implementation and automatically compute
the masking distance between them. We have used this tool to measure the mask-
ing tolerance of multiple instances of several case studies such as a redundant cell
memory, a variation of the dining philosophers problem, the bounded retrans-
mission protocol, N-Modular-Redundancy, and the Byzantine generals problem.
These are typical examples of fault-tolerant systems.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
preliminaries notions used throughout this paper. We present in Section 3 the
formal definition of masking distance build on quantitative simulation games
and we also prove its basic properties. We describe in Section 4 the experimental
evaluation on some well-known case studies. In Section 5 we discuss the related
work. Finally, we discuss in Section 6 some conclusions and directions for further
work. Full details and proofs can be found in [4].
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2 Preliminaries
Let us introduce some basic definitions and results on game theory that will be
necessary across the paper, the interested reader is referred to [1].
A transition system (TS) is a tuple A = 〈S,Σ,E, s0〉, where S is a finite set
of states, Σ is a finite alphabet, E ⊆ S×Σ×S is a set of labelled transitions, and
s0 is the initial state. In the following we use s
e
−→ s′ ∈ E to denote (s, e, s′) ∈ E.
Let |S| and |E| denote the number of states and edges, respectively. We define
post(s) = {s′ ∈ S | s
e
−→ s′ ∈ E} as the set of successors of s. Similarly, pre(s′) =
{s ∈ S | s
e
−→ s′ ∈ E} as the set of predecessors of s′. Moreover, post∗(s) denotes
the states which are reachable from s. Without loss of generality, we require that
every state s has a successor, i.e., ∀s ∈ S : post(s) 6= ∅. A run in a transition
system A is an infinite path ρ = ρ0σ0ρ1σ1ρ2σ2 · · · ∈ (S ·Σ)w where ρ0 = s0 and
for all i, ρi
σi−→ ρi+1 ∈ E. From now on, given a tuple (x0, . . . , xn), we denote by
pri((x0, . . . , xn)) its i-th projection.
A game graph G is a tuple G = 〈S, S1, S2, Σ,E, s0〉 where S, Σ, E and s0 are
as in transition systems and (S1, S2) is a partition of S. The choice of the next
state is made by Player 1 (Player 2) when the current state is in S1 (respectively,
S2). A weighted game graph is a game graph along with a weight function v
G
from E to Q. A run in the game graph G is called a play. The set of all plays is
denoted by Ω.
Given a game graph G, a strategy for Player 1 is a function pi : (S ·Σ)∗S1 →
S×Σ such that for all ρ0σ0ρ1σ1 . . . ρi ∈ (S·Σ)
∗S1, we have that if pi(ρ0σ0ρ1σ1 . . . ρi) =
(σ, ρ), then ρi
σ
−→ ρ ∈ E. A strategy for Player 2 is defined in a similar way. The
set of all strategies for Player p is denoted byΠp. A strategy for player p is said to
be memoryless (or positional) if it can be defined by a mapping f : Sp → E such
that for all s ∈ Sp we have that pr0(f(s)) = s, that is, these strategies do not
need memory of the past history. Furthermore, a play ρ0σ0ρ1σ1ρ2σ2 . . . conforms
to a player p strategy pi if ∀i ≥ 0 : (ρi ∈ Sp) ⇒ (σi, ρi+1) = pi(ρ0σ0ρ1σ1 . . . ρi).
The outcome of a Player 1 strategy pi1 and a Player 2 strategy pi2 is the unique
play, named out(pi1, pi2), that conforms to both pi1 and pi2.
A game is made of a game graph and a boolean or quantitative objective.
A boolean objective is a function Φ : Ω → {0, 1} and the goal of Player 1 in a
game with objective Φ is to select a strategy so that the outcome maps to 1,
independently what Player 2 does. On the contrary, the goal of Player 2 is to
ensure that the outcome maps to 0. Given a boolean objective Φ, a play ρ is
winning for Player 1 (resp. Player 2) if Φ(ρ) = 1 (resp. Φ(ρ) = 0). A strategy pi is
a winning strategy for Player p if every play conforming to pi is winning for Player
p. We say that a game with boolean objective is determined if some player has
a winning strategy, and we say that it is memoryless determined if that winning
strategy is memoryless. Reachability games are those games whose objective
functions are defined as Φ(ρ0σ0ρ1σ1ρ2σ2 . . . ) = (∃i : ρi ∈ V ) for some set V ⊆ S,
a standard result is that reachability games are memoryless determined.
A quantitative objective is given by a payoff function f : Ω → R and the goal
of Player 1 is to maximize the value f of the play, whereas the goal of Player
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2 is to minimize it. For a quantitative objective f , the value of the game for a
Player 1 strategy pi1, denoted by v1(pi1), is defined as the infimum over all the
values resulting from Player 2 strategies, i.e., v1(pi1) = infpi2∈Π2 f(out(pi1, pi2)).
The value of the game for Player 1 is defined as the supremum of the values of
all Player 1 strategies, i.e., suppi1∈Π1 v1(pi1). Analogously, the value of the game
for a Player 2 strategy pi2 and the value of the game for Player 2 are defined
as v2(pi2) = suppi1∈Π1 f(out(pi1, pi2)) and infpi2∈Π2 v2(pi2), respectively. We say
that a game is determined if both values are equal, that is: suppi1∈Π1 v1(pi1) =
infpi2∈Π2 v2(pi2). In this case we denote by val(G) the value of game G. The
following result from [22] characterizes a large set of determined games.
Theorem 1. Any game with a quantitative function f that is bounded and Borel
measurable is determined.
3 Masking Distance
We start by defining masking simulation. In [10], we have defined a state-based
simulation for masking fault-tolerance, here we recast this definition using la-
belled transition systems. First, let us introduce some concepts needed for defin-
ing masking fault-tolerance. For any vocabulary Σ, and set of labels F =
{F0, . . . , Fn} not belonging to Σ, we consider ΣF = Σ ∪ F , where F ∩ Σ = ∅.
Intuitively, the elements of F indicate the occurrence of a fault in a faulty
implementation. Furthermore, sometimes it will be useful to consider the set
Σi = {ei | e ∈ Σ}, containing the elements of Σ indexed with superscript i.
Moreover, for any vocabulary Σ we consider ΣM = Σ ∪ {M}, where M /∈ Σ,
intuitively, this label is used to identify masking transitions.
Given a transition system A = 〈S,Σ,E, s0〉 over a vocabulary Σ, we denote
AM = 〈S,ΣM, EM , s0〉 where EM = E ∪ {s
M
−→ s | s ∈ S}.
3.1 Strong Masking Simulation
Definition 1. Let A = 〈S,Σ,E, s0〉 and A′ = 〈S′, ΣF , E′, s′0〉 be two transition
systems. A′ is strong masking fault-tolerant with respect to A if there exists a
relation M ⊆ S × S′ (considering AM = 〈S,ΣM, E, s0〉 instead of A) such that:
(A) s0 M s
′
0, and
(B) for all s ∈ S, s′ ∈ S′ with sM s′ and all e ∈ Σ the following holds:
(1) if (s
e
−→ t) ∈ E then ∃ t′ ∈ S′ : (s′
e
−→ t′ ∧ tM t′);
(2) if (s′
e
−→ t′) ∈ E′ then ∃ t ∈ S : (s
e
−→ t ∧ t M t′);
(3) if (s′
F
−→ t′) for some F ∈ F then ∃ t ∈ S : (s
M
−→ t ∧ tM t′).
If such relation exist we denote it by A m A′ and say that A′ is a strong
masking fault-tolerant implementation of A.
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We say that state s′ is masking fault-tolerant for s when s M s′. Intuitively,
the definition states that, starting in s′, faults can be masked in such a way
that the behavior exhibited is the same as that observed when starting from
s and executing transitions without faults. In other words, a masking relation
ensures that every faulty behavior in the implementation can be simulated by the
specification. Let us explain in more detail the above definition. First, note that
conditions A, B.1, and B.2 imply that we have a bisimulation when A and A′
do not exhibit faulty behavior. Particularly, condition B.1 says that the normal
execution of A can be simulated by an execution of A′. On the other hand,
condition B.2 says that the implementation does not add normal (non-faulty)
behavior. Finally, condition B.3 states that every outgoing faulty transition (F )
from s′ must be matched to an outgoing masking transition (M) from s.
3.2 Weak Masking Simulation
For analysing nontrivial systems a weak version of masking simulation relation
is needed, the main idea is that weak masking simulation abstracts away from
internal behaviour, which is modeled by a special action τ . Note that internal
transitions are common in fault-tolerance: the actions performed as part of a
fault-tolerant procedure in a component are usually not observable by the rest
of the system.
The weak transition relations ⇒ ⊆ S×(Σ∪{τ}∪{M}∪F)×S, also denoted
as EW , considers the silent step τ and is defined as follow:
e
=⇒=


(
τ
−→)∗◦
e
−→ ◦(
τ
−→)∗ if e ∈ Σ,
(
e
−→)∗ if e = τ,
e
−→ if e ∈ {M} ∪ F .
The symbol ◦ stands for composition of binary relations and (
τ
−→)∗ is the reflexive
and transitive closure of the binary relation
τ
−→.
Intuitively, if e /∈ {τ,M} ∪ F , then s
e
=⇒ s′ means that there is a sequence of
zero or more τ transitions starting in s, followed by one transition labelled by e,
followed again by zero or more τ transitions eventually reaching s′. s
τ
=⇒ s′ states
that s can transition to s′ via zero or more τ transitions. In particular, s
τ
=⇒ s
for avery s. For the case in which e ∈ {M} ∪ F , s
e
=⇒ s′is equivalente to s
e
−→ s′
and hence no τ step is allowed before or after the e transition.
Definition 2. Let A = 〈S,Σ,E, s0〉 and A′ = 〈S′, ΣF , E′, s′0〉 be two transition
systems with Σ possibly containing τ . A′ is weak masking fault-tolerant with
respect to A if there is a relation M ⊆ S × S′ (considering AM instead of A)
such that:
(A) s0 M s
′
0
(B) for all s ∈ S, s′ ∈ S′ with sM s′ and all e ∈ Σ ∪ {τ} the following holds:
(1) if (s
e
−→ t) ∈ E then ∃ t′ ∈ S′ : (s′
e
=⇒ t′ ∈ E′W ∧ tM t
′);
(2) if (s′
e
−→ t′) ∈ E′ then ∃ t ∈ S : (s
e
=⇒ t ∈ EW ∧ tM t′);
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(3) if (s′
F
−→ t′) ∈ E′ for some F ∈ F then ∃ t ∈ S : (s
M
−→ t ∈ E ∧ tM t′).
If such relation exists, we denote it by A wm A
′ and say that A′ is a weak
masking fault-tolerant implementation of A.
The following theorem makes a strong connection between strong and weak
masking simulation. It states that weak masking simulation becomes strong
masking simulation whenever transition −→ is replaced by =⇒ in the original
automata.
Theorem 2. Let A = 〈S,Σ,E, s0〉 and A′ = 〈S′, ΣF , E′, s′0〉. M ⊆ S × S
′
(considering AM instead of A) is a weak masking simulation if and only if:
(A) s0 M s
′
0, and
(B) for all s ∈ S, s′ ∈ S′ with sM s′ and all e ∈ Σ ∪ {τ} the following holds:
(1) if (s
e
=⇒ t) ∈ EW then ∃ t′ ∈ S′ : (s′
e
=⇒ t′ ∈ E′W ∧ tM t
′);
(2) if (s′
e
=⇒ t′) ∈ E′W then ∃ t ∈ S : (s
e
=⇒ t ∈ EW ∧ tM t
′);
(3) if (s′
F
=⇒ t′) ∈ E′W for some F ∈ F then ∃ t ∈ S : (s
M
=⇒ t ∈ EW ∧tM t′)
The proof of this theorem is straightforward following the same ideas of
Milner in [24].
A natural way to check weak bisimilarity is to saturate the transition system
[12,24] and then check strong bisimilarity on the saturated transition system.
Similarly, Theorem 2 allows us to compute weak masking simulation by reducing
it to strong masking simulation. Note that
e
=⇒ can be alternatively defined by:
p
e
−→ q
p
e
=⇒ q p
τ
=⇒ p
p
τ
=⇒ p1
e
=⇒ q1
τ
=⇒ q
p
e
=⇒ q
(e /∈ {M} ∪ F)
As a running example, we consider a memory cell that stores a bit of infor-
mation and supports reading and writing operations, presented in a state-based
form in [10]. A state in this system maintains the current value of the memory
cell (m = i, for i = 0, 1), writing allows one to change this value, and reading re-
turns the stored value. Obviously, in this system the result of a reading depends
on the value stored in the cell. Thus, a property that one might associate with
this model is that the value read from the cell coincides with that of the last
writing performed in the system.
A potential fault in this scenario occurs when a cell unexpectedly loses its
charge, and its stored value turns into another one (e.g., it changes from 1 to
0 due to charge loss). A typical technique to deal with this situation is redun-
dancy: use three memory bits instead of one. Writing operations are performed
simultaneously on the three bits. Reading, on the other hand, returns the value
that is repeated at least twice in the memory bits; this is known as voting.
We take the following approach to model this system. Labels W0,W1,R0,
and R1 represent writing and reading operations. Specifically, W0 (resp. W1):
writes a zero (resp. one) in the memory. R0 (resp. R1): reads a zero (resp. one)
from the memory. Figure 1 depicts four transition systems. The leftmost one
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represents the nominal system for this example (denoted as A). The second
one from the left characterizes the nominal transition system augmented with
masking transitions, i.e., AM . The third and fourth transition systems are fault-
tolerant implementations of A, named A′ and A′′, respectively. Note that A′
contains one fault, while A′′ considers two faults. Both implementations use
triple redundancy; intuitively, state t0 contains the three bits with value zero
and t1 contains the three bits with value one. Moreover, state t2 is reached
when one of the bits was flipped (either 001, 010 or 100). In A′′, state t3 is
reached after a second bit is flipped (either 011 or 101 or 110) starting from
state t0. It is straightforward to see that there exists a relation of masking
s
0
s
1
t
0
t
1
t
2
R
0
W
0
W
1
R
1 R1
R
0 R0
W
0
W
0
W
0
W
1
W
0
F
W
1W1
W
1
s
0
s
1
R
0
W
0
W
1
R
1
W
0
W
1
M
M
t
0
t
1
t
2
R
1
R
0 R0
W
0
W
0
W
1
F
W
1
t
3
F
W
1
W
0
W
1
W
0
R
1
Fig. 1. Transition systems for the memory cell.
fault-tolerance between AM and A′, as it is witnessed by the relation M =
{(s0, t0), (s1, t1), (s0, t2)}. It is a routine to check that M satisfies the conditions
of Definition 1. On the other hand, there does not exist a masking relation
between AM and A′′ because state t3 needs to be related to state s0 in any
masking relation. This state can only be reached by executing faults, which are
necessarily masked with M -transitions. However, note that, in state t3, we can
read a 1 (transition t3
R1−−→ t3) whereas, in state s0, we can only read a 0.
3.3 Masking Simulation Game
We define a masking simulation game for two transition systems (the specifica-
tion of the nominal system and its fault-tolerant implementation) that captures
masking fault-tolerance. We first define the masking game graph where we have
two players named by convenience the refuter (R) and the verifier (V ).
Definition 3. Let A = 〈S,Σ,E, s0〉 and A
′ = 〈S′, ΣF , E
′
W , s
′
0〉. The strong
masking game graph GAM ,A′ = 〈S
G, SR, SV , Σ
G, EG, s0
G〉 for two players is
defined as follows:
– ΣG = ΣM ∪ΣF
– SG = (S × (Σ1M ∪Σ
2
F ∪ {#})× S
′ × {R, V }) ∪ {serr}
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– The initial state is sG0 = 〈s0,#, s
′
0, R〉, where the refuter starts playing
– The refuter’s states are SR = {(s,#, s′, R) | s ∈ S ∧ s′ ∈ S′} ∪ {serr}
– The verifier’s states are SV = {(s, σ, s′, V ) | s ∈ S∧s′ ∈ S′∧σ ∈ ΣG \{M}}
and EG is the minimal set satisfying:
– {(s,#, s′, R)
σ
−→ (t, σ1, s′, V ) | ∃ σ ∈ Σ : s
σ
−→ t ∈ E} ⊆ EG,
– {(s,#, s′, R)
σ
−→ (s, σ2, t′, V ) | ∃ σ ∈ ΣF : s
′ σ−→ t′ ∈ E′} ⊆ EG,
– {(s, σ2, s′, V )
σ
−→ (t,#, s′, R) | ∃ σ ∈ Σ : s
σ
−→ t ∈ E} ⊆ EG,
– {(s, σ1, s′, V )
σ
−→ (s,#, t′, R) | ∃ σ ∈ Σ : s′
σ
−→ t′ ∈ E′} ⊆ EG,
– {(s, F 2i , s
′, V )
M
−→ (t,#, s′, R) | ∃ s
M
−→ t ∈ EM} ⊆ EG, for any Fi ∈ F
– If there is no outgoing transition from some state s then transitions s
σ
−→ serr
and serr
σ
−→ serr for every σ ∈ Σ, are added.
The intuition of this game is as follows. The refuter chooses transitions of
either the specification or the implementation to play, and the verifier tries to
match her choice, this is similar to the bisimulation game [26]. However, when the
refuter chooses a fault, the verifier must match it with a masking transition (M).
The intuitive reading of this is that the fault-tolerant implementation masked
the fault in such a way that the occurrence of this fault cannot be noticed from
the users’ side. R wins if the game reaches the error state, i.e., serr. On the
other hand, V wins when serr is not reached during the game. (This is basically
a reachability game [25]). We say Ver(v) (resp. Ref(v)) if v is a verifier’s node
(resp. refuter’s node).
A weak masking game graph GW
AM ,A′
is defined in the same way as the strong
masking game graph in Def. 3, with the exception that ΣM and ΣF may contain
τ , and the set of labelled transitions (denoted as EGW ) is now defined using
the weak transition relations (i.e., EW and E
′
W ) from the respective transition
systems.
Figure 2 shows a part of the strong masking game graph for the running
example considering the transition systems AM and A′′. We can clearly observe
on the game graph that the verifier cannot mimic the transition (s0,#, t3, R)
R21−−→
(s0, R
2
1, t3, V ) selected by the refuter which reads a 1 at state t3 on the fault-
tolerant implementation. This is because the verifier can only read a 0 at state
s0. Then, the serr is reached and the refuter wins.
As expected, there is a strong masking simulation between A and A′ if and
only if the verifier has a winning strategy in GAM ,A′ .
Theorem 3. Let A = 〈S,Σ,E, s0〉 and A′ = 〈S′, ΣF , E′, s′0〉. A m A
′ iff the
verifier has a winning strategy for the strong masking game graph GAM ,A′ .
By Theorems 2 and 3, the result replicates for weak masking game.
Theorem 4. Let A = 〈S,Σ ∪{τ}, E, s0〉 and A′ = 〈S′, ΣF ∪{τ}, E′, s′0〉. A 
w
m
A′ iff the verifier has a winning strategy for the weak masking game graph
GW
AM ,A′
.
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Using the standard properties of reachability games we get the following
property.
Theorem 5. For any A and A′, the strong (resp. weak) masking game graph
GAM ,A′ (resp. G
W
AM ,A′
) is determined. Furthermore, the strong (resp. weak) mask-
ing game graph can be determined in time O(|EG|) (resp. O(|EGW |)).
W
0
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Fig. 2. Part of the masking game graph for memory cell model with two faults
The set of winning states for the refuter can be defined in a standard way
from the error state [25]. We adapt ideas in [25] to our setting. For i, j ≥ 0, sets
U ji are defined as follows:
U0i =U
j
0 = ∅ (1)
U11 ={serr},
U j+1i+1 = {v
′ | Ref(v′) ∧ post(v′) ∩ U ji+1 6= ∅}
∪ {v′ | V er(v′) ∧ post(v′) ⊆
⋃
j′≤j U
j′
i+1 ∧ post(v
′) ∩ U ji+1 6= ∅ ∧ pi2(v
′) /∈ F}
∪ {v′ | V er(v′) ∧ post(v′) ⊆
⋃
i′≤i,j′≤j U
j′
i′ ∧ post(v
′) ∩ U ji 6= ∅ ∧ pi2(v
′) ∈ F}
then Uk =
⋃
i≥0 U
k
i and U =
⋃
k≥0 U
k. Intuitively, the subindex i in Uki indicates
that serr is reach after at most i − 1 faults occurred. The following lemma is
straightforwardly proven using standard techniques of reachability games [8].
Lemma 1. The refuter has a winning strategy in GAM ,A′ (or G
W
AM ,A′
) iff sinit ∈
Uk, for some k.
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3.4 Quantitative Masking
In this section, we extend the strong masking simulation game introduced above
with quantitative objectives to define the notion of masking fault-tolerance dis-
tance. Note that we use the attribute “quantitative” in a non-probabilistic sense.
Definition 4. For transition systems A and A′, the quantitative strong masking
game graph QAM ,A′ = 〈S
G, SR, SV , Σ
G, EG, sG0 , v
G〉 is defined as follows:
– GAM ,A′ = 〈S
G, SR, SV , Σ
G, EG, sG0 〉 is defined as in Definition 3,
– vG(s
e
−→ s′) = (χF (e), χserr (s
′))
where χF is the characteristic function over set F , returning 1 if e ∈ F and 0
otherwise, and χserr is the characteristic function over the singleton set {serr}.
Note that the cost function returns a pair of numbers instead of a single
number. It is direct to codify this pair into a number, but we do not do it here
for the sake of clarity. We remark that the quantitative weak masking game graph
QW
AM ,A′
is defined in the same way as the game graph defined above but using
the weak masking game graph GW
AM ,A′
instead of GAM ,A′
Given a quantitative strong masking game graph with the weight function
vG and a play ρ = ρ0σ0ρ1σ1ρ2, . . ., for all i ≥ 0, let vi = vG(ρi
σi−→ ρi+1). We
define the masking payoff function as follow:
fm(ρ) = lim
n→∞
pr1(vn)
1 +
∑n
i=0 pr0(vi)
,
which is proportional to the inverse of the number of masking movements made
by the verifier. To see this, note that the numerator of
pr1(vn)
1+
∑
n
i=0 pr0(vi)
will be
1 when we reach the error state, that is, in those paths not reaching the error
state this formula returns 0. Furthermore, if the error state is reached, then
the denominator will count the number of fault transitions taken until the error
state. All of them, except the last one, were masked successfully. The last fault,
instead, while attempted to be masked by the verifier, eventually leads to the
error state. That is, the transitions with value 1 are those corresponding to faults.
The others are mapped to 0. Notice also that if serr is reached in vn without
the occurrence of any fault, the nominal part of the implementation does not
match the nominal specification, in which case
pr
1
(vn)
1+
∑
n
i=0 pr0(vi)
= 1. Then, the
refuter wants to maximize the value of any run, that is, she will try to execute
faults leading to the state serr. In contrast, the verifier wants to avoid serr and
then she will try to mask faults with actions that take her away from the er-
ror state. More precisely, the value of the quantitative strong masking game for
the refuter is defined as valR(QAM ,A′) = suppiR∈ΠR infpiV ∈ΠV fm(out(piR, piV )).
Analogously, the value of the game for the verifier is defined as valV (QAM ,A′) =
infpiV ∈ΠV suppiR∈ΠR fm(out(piR, piV )). Then, we define the value of the quan-
titative strong masking game, denoted by val(QAM ,A′), as the value of the
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game either for the refuter or the verifier, i.e., val(QAM ,A′) = valR(QAM ,A′) =
valV (QAM ,A′). This can be done because quantitative strong masking games are
determined as we prove below in Theorem 6.
Definition 5. Let A and A′ be transition systems. The strong masking distance
between A and A′, denoted by δm(A,A
′) is defined as: δm(A,A
′) = val(QAM ,A′).
We would like to remark that the weak masking distance δWm is defined in
the same way for the quantitative weak masking game graph QW
AM ,A′
. Roughly
speaking, we are interesting on measuring the number of faults that can be
masked. The value of the game is essentially determined by the faulty and mask-
ing labels on the game graph and how the players can find a strategy that leads
(or avoids) the state serr, independently if there are or not silent actions.
In the following, we state some basic properties of this kind of games. As
already anticipated, quantitative strong masking games are determined:
Theorem 6. For any quantitative strong masking game QAM ,A′ with payoff
function fm,
infpiV ∈ΠV suppiR∈ΠR fm(out(piR, piV )) = suppiR∈ΠR infpiV ∈ΠV fm(out(piR, piV ))
The value of the quantitative strong masking game can be calculated as
stated below.
Theorem 7. Let QAM ,A′ be a quantitative strong masking game. Then, val(QAM ,A′) =
1
w
, with w = min{i | ∃j : sinit ∈ U
j
i }, whenever sinit ∈ U , and val(QAM ,A′) = 0
otherwise, where sets U ji and U are defined in equation (1).
Note that the sets U ji can be calculated using a bottom-up breadth-first search
from the error state. Thus, the strategies for the refuter and the verifier can
be defined using these sets, without taking into account the history of the play.
That is, we have the following theorems:
Theorem 8. Players R and V have memoryless winning strategies for QAM ,A′ .
Theorems 6, 7, and 8 apply as well to QW
AM ,A′
. The following theorem states the
complexity of determining the value of the two types of games.
Theorem 9. The quantitative strong (weak) masking game can be determined
in time O(|SG|+ |EG|) (resp. O(|SG|+ |EGW |)).
By using QW
AM ,A′
instead of QAM ,A′ in Definition 5, we can define the weak
masking distance δWm . The next theorem states that, if A and A
′ are at distance
0, there is a strong (or weak) masking simulation between them.
Theorem 10. For any transition systems A and A′, then (i) δm(A,A
′) = 0 iff
A m A′, and (ii) δWm (A,A
′) = 0 iff A wm A
′.
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This follows from Theorem 7. Noting that A m A (and A 
w
m A) for any
transition system A, we obtain that δm(A,A) = 0 (resp. δ
W
m (A,A) = 0) by
Theorem 10, i.e., both distance are reflexive.
For our running example, the masking distance is 1/3 with a redundancy of
3 bits and considering two faults. This means that only one fault can be masked
by this implementation. We can prove a version of the triangle inequality for our
notion of distance.
Theorem 11. Let A = 〈S,Σ,E, s0〉, A′ = 〈S′, ΣF ′ , E′, s′0〉, and A
′′ = 〈S′′, ΣF ′′ ,
E′′, s′′0〉 be transition systems such that F
′ ⊆ F ′′. Then δm(A,A′′) ≤ δm(A,A′)+
δm(A
′, A′′) and δWm (A,A
′′) ≤ δWm (A,A
′) + δWm (A
′, A′′).
Reflexivity and the triangle inequality imply that both masking distances are
directed semi-metrics [6,9]. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the triangle
inequality property has practical applications. When developing critical software
is quite common to develop a first version of the software taking into account
some possible anticipated faults. Later, after testing and running of the system,
more plausible faults could be observed. Consequently, the system is modified
with additional fault-tolerant capabilities to be able to overcome them. Theorem
11 states that incrementally measuring the masking distance between these dif-
ferent versions of the software provides an upper bound to the actual distance
between the nominal system and its last fault-tolerant version. That is, if the
sum of the distances obtained between the different versions is a small number,
then we can ensure that the final system will exhibit an acceptable masking
tolerance to faults w.r.t. the nominal system.
4 Experimental Evaluation
The approach described in this paper have been implemented in a tool in Java
called MaskD: Masking Distance Tool [?]. MaskD takes as input a nominal model
and its fault-tolerant implementation, and produces as output the masking dis-
tance between them. The input models are specified using the guarded com-
mand language introduced in [?], a simple programming language common for
describing fault-tolerant algorithms. More precisely, a program is a collection of
processes, where each process is composed of a collection of actions of the style:
Guard→ Command, where Guard is a boolean condition over the actual state
of the program and Command is a collection of basic assignments. These syn-
tactical constructions are called actions. The language also allows user to label
an action as internal (i.e., τ actions). Moreover, usually some actions are used
to represent faults. The tool has several additional features, for instance it can
print the traces to the error state or start a simulation from the initial state.
We report on Table 1 the results of the masking distance for multiple in-
stances of several case studies. These are: a Redundant Cell Memory (our run-
ning example), N-Modular Redundancy (a standard example of fault-tolerant
system [?]), a variation of the Dining Philosophers problem [?], the Byzantine
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Generals problem introduced by Lamport et al. [20], and the Bounded Retrans-
mission Protocol (a well-known example of fault-tolerant protocol [14]).
Some words are useful to interpret the results. For the case of a 3 bit memory
the masking distance is 0.333, the main reason for this is that the faulty model
in the worst case is only able to mask 2 faults (in this example, a fault is an unex-
pected change of a bit value) before failing to replicate the nominal behaviour (i.e.
reading the majority value), thus the result comes from the definition of masking
distance and taking into account the occurrence of two faults. The situation is
similar for the other instances of this problem with more redundancy.
N-Modular-Redundancy consists of N systems, in which these perform a pro-
cess and that results are processed by a majority-voting system to produce a
single output. Assuming a single perfect voter, we have evaluated this case study
for different numbers of modules. Note that the distance measures for this case
study are similar to the memory example.
For the dining philosophers problem we have adopted the odd/even philoso-
phers implementation (it prevents from deadlock), i.e., there are n − 1 even
philosophers that pick the right fork first, and 1 odd philosopher that picks the
left fork first. The fault we consider in this case occurs when an even philoso-
pher behaves as an odd one, this could be the case of a byzantine fault. For two
philosophers the masking distance is 0.5 since a single fault leads to a deadlock,
when more philosophers are added this distance becomes smaller.
Another interesting example of a fault-tolerant system is the Byzantine gen-
erals problem, introduced originally by Lamport et al. [20]. This is a consensus
problem, where we have a general with n − 1 lieutenants. The communication
between the general and his lieutenants is performed through messengers. The
general may decide to attack an enemy city or to retreat; then, he sends the order
to his lieutenants. Some of the lieutenants might be traitors. We assume that
the messages are delivered correctly and all the lieutenants can communicate
directly with each other. In this scenario they can recognize who is sending a
message. Faults can convert loyal lieutenants into traitors (byzantines faults). As
a consequence, traitors might deliver false messages or perhaps they avoid send-
ing a message that they received. The loyal lieutenants must agree on attacking
or retreating after m + 1 rounds of communication, where m is the maximum
numbers of traitors.
The Bounded Retransmission Protocol (BRP) is a well-known industrial case
study in software verification. While all the other case studies were treated as toy
examples and analyzed with δm, the BRP was modeled closer to the implemen-
tation following [14], considering the different components (sender, receiver, and
models of the channels). To analyze such a complex model we have used instead
the weak masking distance δWm . We have calculated the masking distance for
the bounded retransmission protocol with 1, 3 and 5 chunks, denoted BRP(1),
BRP(3) and BRP(5), respectively. We observe that the distance values are not
affected by the number of chunks to be sent by the protocol. This is expected
because the masking distance depends on the redundancy added to mask the
faults, which in this case, depends on the number of retransmissions.
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Table 1. Results of the masking distance for the case studies.
Case Study Redundancy
Masking
Time
Distance
Memory
3 bits 0.333 0.7s
5 bits 0.25 1.5s
7 bits 0.2 27s
9 bits 0.167 34m33s
N-Modular
Redundancy
3 modules 0.333 0.3s
5 modules 0.25 0.5s
7 modules 0.2 31.7s
9 modules 0.167 115m
Philosophers
2 phils 0.5 0.3s
3 phils 0.333 0.6s
4 phils 0.25 7.1s
5 phils 0.2 13m.53s
Byzantines
3 generals 0.5 0.5s
4 generals 0.333 2s
Case Study Redundancy
Masking
Time
Distance
BRP(1)
1 retransm. 0.333 1.2s
3 retransm. 0.2 1.4s
5 retransm. 0.143 1.5s
7 retransm. 0.111 2.1s
BRP(3)
1 retransm. 0.333 5.5s
3 retransm. 0.2 14.9s
5 retransm. 0.143 1m28s
7 retransm. 0.111 4m40s
BRP(5)
1 retransm. 0.333 6.7s
3 retransm. 0.2 32s
5 retransm. 0.143 1m51s
7 retransm. 0.111 6m35s
We have run our experiments on a MacBook Air with Processor 1.3 GHz
Intel Core i5 and a memory of 4 Gb. The tool and case studies for reproducing
the results are available in the tool repository.
5 Related Work
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the quantitative generaliza-
tions of the boolean notion of correctness and the corresponding quantitative veri-
fication questions [3,5,15,16]. The framework described in [5] is the closest related
work to our approach. The authors generalize the traditional notion of simulation
relation to three different versions of simulation distance: correctness, coverage,
and robustness. These are defined using quantitative games with discounted-sum
and mean-payoff objectives, two well-known cost functions. Similarly to that
work, we also consider distances between purely discrete (non-probabilistic, un-
timed) systems. Correctness and coverage distances are concerned with the nom-
inal part of the systems, and so faults play no role on them. On the other hand,
robustness distance measures how many unexpected errors can be performed by
the implementation in such a way that the resulting behavior is tolerated by the
specification. So, it can be used to analyze the resilience of the implementation.
Note that, robustness distance can only be applied to correct implementations,
that is, implementations that preserve the behavior of the specification but per-
haps do not cover all its behavior. As noted in [5], bisimilarity sometimes implies
a distance of 1. In this sense a greater grade of robustness (as defined in [5]) is
achieved by pruning critical points from the specification. Furthermore, the er-
rors considered in that work are transitions mimicking the original ones but with
different labels. In contrast to this, in our approach we consider that faults are
injected into the fault-tolerant implementation, where their behaviors are not
restricted by the nominal system. This follows the idea of model extension in
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fault-tolerance where faulty behavior is added to the nominal system. Further,
note that when no faults are present, the masking distance between the specifi-
cation and the implementation is 0 when they are bisimilar, and it is 1 otherwise.
It is useful to note that robustness distance of [5] is not reflexive. We believe that
all these definitions of distance between systems capture different notions useful
for software development, and they can be used together, in a complementary
way, to obtain an in-depth evaluation of fault-tolerant implementations.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we presented a notion of masking fault-tolerance distance be-
tween systems built on a characterization of masking tolerance via simulation
relations and a corresponding game representation with quantitative objectives.
Our framework is well-suited to support engineers for the analysis and design
of fault-tolerant systems. More precisely, we have defined a computable mask-
ing distance function such that an engineer can measure the masking tolerance
of a given fault-tolerant implementation, i.e., the number of faults that can be
masked. Thereby, the engineer can measure and compare the masking fault-
tolerance distance of alternative fault-tolerant implementations, and select one
that fits best to her preferences.
There are many directions for future work. We have only defined a notion of
fault-tolerance distance for masking fault-tolerance, similar notions of distance
can be defined for other levels of fault-tolerance like failsafe and non-masking,
we leave this as a further work.
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A Definitions
Definition 6. Given two transition systems A = 〈S,Σ,E, s0〉 and A′ = 〈S′, ΣF , E′W , s
′
0〉
(where Σ and ΣF possible contains the distinguished silent action τ), we define
the weak masking game graph GW
AM ,A′
= 〈SG, SR, SV , ΣG, EGW , s0
G〉 for two
players as follows:
– ΣG = ΣM ∪ΣF ∪ {τ}
– SG = (S × (Σ1M ∪Σ
2
F ∪ {τ} ∪ {#})× S
′ × {R, V }) ∪ {serr}
– The initial state is sG0 = 〈s0,#, s
′
0, R〉, where the refuter starts playing
– The refuter’s states are SR = {(s,#, s′, R) | s ∈ S ∧ s′ ∈ S′} ∪ {serr}
– The verifier’s states are SV = {(s, σ, s′, V ) | s ∈ S∧s′ ∈ S′∧σ ∈ ΣG \{M}}
and EGW is the minimal set satisfying:
– {(s,#, s′, R)
σ
−→ (t, σ1, s′, V ) | ∃ σ ∈ Σ : s
σ
=⇒ t ∈ EW } ⊆ EGW ,
– {(s,#, s′, R)
σ
−→ (s, σ2, t′, V ) | ∃ σ ∈ ΣF : s
′ σ=⇒ t′ ∈ E′W } ⊆ E
G
W ,
– {(s, σ2, s′, V )
σ
−→ (t,#, s′, R) | ∃ σ ∈ Σ : s
σ
=⇒ t ∈ EW } ⊆ EGW ,
– {(s, σ1, s′, V )
σ
−→ (s,#, t′, R) | ∃ σ ∈ Σ : s′
σ
=⇒ t′ ∈ E′W } ⊆ E
G
W ,
– {(s, F 2i , s
′, V )
M
−→ (t,#, s′, R) | ∃ s
M
=⇒ t ∈ EM} ⊆ EGW , for any Fi ∈ F
– If there is no outgoing transition from some state s then transitions s
σ
−→ serr
and serr
σ
−→ serr for every σ ∈ Σ, are added.
B Proofs of Properties
Proof of Lemma 1. The refuter has a winning strategy in GAM ,A′ (or G
W
AM ,A′
)
iff sinit ∈ Uk, for some k.
Proof. ⇒) Suppose that the Refuter has a winning strategy namely pi and that
sinit /∈ Uki for any i and k. This means that pi(sinit) returns a node v such that
v /∈ Uki (for any i and k) (by definition of U
k
i ), and from there the Verifier can
select a node v′ /∈ Uki (for any i and k), and again this can be repeated forever.
Therefore, the play never reaches serr, which means that the Verifier wins and
that leads to a contradiction.
⇐) Consider sinit ∈ Uk for some k, where we have that sinit ∈ Uki for some
i by definition. Any winning strategy for the refuter is simple, for any v ∈ U ji ,
pi(v) = v′ being v′ some node in U j−1i which exists by definition. Since sinit ∈ U
k
and the Refuter has to play, then the play will reach in j − 1 steps the set U1,
i.e., the serr state.
The proof also apply for the weak masking game graph GW
AM ,A′
. ⋄
Proof of Theorem 3. Let A = 〈S,Σ,E, s0〉 and A′ = 〈S′, ΣF , E′, s′0〉. A m A
′
iff the verifier has a winning strategy for the strong masking game graph GAM ,A′ .
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Proof. ⇒) Suppose that A m A
′, then there exists a masking simulation
M ⊆ S × S′ by Definition 1. Then, the strategy of the verifier is constructed as
follows, for states (s, σi, s′, V ) with s M s′ and σ /∈ F , the strategy selects either
a transition s
σ
−→ w or s′
σ
−→ w′ depending if i = 1 or i = 2, respectively. In case
of σ ∈ F , then the strategy returns the transition (s, F 2j , s
′, V )
M
−→ (s,#, s′, R),
for any Fj ∈ F . This can be done since s M s′. Furthermore, in any case we
have w M s′, s M w′ or s M s′, respectively. Thus, the strategy can be
applied again for any movement of the Refuter. Summing up, the Verifier can
play forever and then the strategy is winning for her. Hence, the strategy is
winning for game GAM ,A′ since sinit M s
′
init.
⇐) Suppose that the verifier has a winning strategy from the initial state.
Then, we define a masking simulation relation asM = {(s, s′) | V has a winning stra-
tegy for (s,#, s′, R)}. It is simple to see that it is a masking simulation. Further-
more, sinit M s
′
init, then A m A
′.
The proof is similar for the theorem that A wm A
′ iff the verifier has a winning
strategy for the weak masking game graph GW
AM ,A′
, but using GW
AM ,A′
instead of
GAM ,A′ and by theorem 2.
⋄
Proof of Theorem 6. For any quantitative strong masking game QAM ,A′ with
payoff function fm,
infpiV ∈ΠV suppiR∈ΠR fm(out(piR, piV )) = suppiR∈ΠR infpiV ∈ΠV fm(out(piR, piV ))
Proof. In order to prove that the masking payoff function fm is determined we
have to prove that it is bounded and Borel measurable (Martin’s theorem [22]).
First, fm is bounded by definition. Second, to see that fm is Borel measurable
note that fm(Ω) ⊆ [0, 1], and then it is sufficient to prove that, for every rational
x, f−1m ((−∞, x]) is Borel in the Cantor topology of infinite executions. Consider
f−1m ([−∞, x]) for an arbitrary x, this is the same as f
−1
m ([0,
1
a
]) for a given a.
But, f−1m ([0,
1
a
]) =
⋃
b≥a Ab where Ab =
⋃
i>0 A
i
b for A
i
b = {ρ0σ0ρ1σ1 · · · | ρi =
serr ∧
∑i−1
j=0 χF (σj) = b}. Note that A
i
b = {Cρ0σ0...ρi |
∑i−1
j=0 χF (σj) = b} where
Cρ0σ0...ρi is the cone corresponding to initial segment ρ0σ0 . . . ρi which is Borel
measurable, and so Aib, Ab and f
−1
m ((−∞, x]) are Borel measurable. ⋄
Proof of Theorem 7. Let QAM ,A′ be a quantitative strong masking game.
Then, val(QAM ,A′) =
1
w
, with w = min{i | ∃j : sinit ∈ U
j
i }, whenever sinit ∈ U ,
and val(QAM ,A′) = 0 otherwise, where sets U
j
i and U are defined in equation (1).
Proof. First, note that any play avoiding state serr has value 0. By definition
of the game, each transition performed by the Refuter must be followed by a
transition selected by the Verifier. These transitions (the matches performed by
the Verifier) have cost (1, 0) since the target of any of these transition is different
from serr. Because we have an infinite number of these matches, when state serr
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is not reached, the valuation of these plays is limn→∞
0
1+
∑
n
i=0 vi
= 0. Otherwise,
if sinit ∈ U
j
i for some j ≥ 1, we denote by Π the set of Refuter’s strategies
satisfying the following: If v ∈ U ji for i, j > 1 and post(v) ∩ U
j−1
i 6= ∅, then
pi(v) = v′, for some v′ ∈ post(v) ∩ U j−1i . Note that Π 6= ∅, since any Refuter’s
node in a set U ji has a successor belonging to U
j−1
i . Now, any play from sinit
following a strategy in Π contains the occurrence of at most i faults since the
unique way of decreasing i is by performing a masking after a fault, and i ≤ j
always. That is, for any piV ∈ ΠV and piR ∈ Π we have that val(piV , piR) =
1
i
.
Thus, val(QAM ,A′) ≥
1
i
. Hence, val(QAM ,A′) ≥
1
w
for w = min{i | ∃j : sinit ∈
U ji }.
Now, note that for those nodes si /∈ U ij for every i and j, the Verifier has
strategies piV such that val(piV , piR) = 0 for any Refuter’s strategy piR. Then,
for any Refuter’s strategy piR /∈ Π we have that infpiR∈ΠR val(piV , piR) = 0.
That is, for any Refuter’s strategy we have infpiV ∈ΠV val(piV , piR) ≤
1
w
for w =
min{i | ∃j : sinit ∈ U
j
i }. Therefore, suppiR∈ΠR infpiV ∈ΠV val(piV , piR) ≤
1
w
. That
is, val(QAM ,A′) ≤
1
w
, i.e., val(QAM ,A′) =
1
w
. ⋄
Proof of Theorem 11. Let A = 〈S,Σ,E, s0〉, A′ = 〈S′, ΣF ′ , E′, s′0〉, and A
′′ =
〈S′′, ΣF ′′ , E
′′, s′′0〉 be transition systems such that F
′ ⊆ F ′′. Then δm(A,A
′′) ≤
δm(A,A
′) + δm(A
′, A′′) and δWm (A,A
′′) ≤ δWm (A,A
′) + δWm (A
′, A′′).
Proof. Let us consider any node (s,#, s′′, R) of the game QAM ,A′′ belonging to
U ji with j ≥ 2. Note that j cannot be the error state and so j 6= 1; moreover, after
the movement of the Refuter we have at least one movement from the Verifier.
In addition, for every nodes (s,#, s′, R) in QAM ,A′ with (s,#, s
′, R) ∈ Uk
′
i′ and
(s′,#, s′′, R) of game QA′M ,A′′ with (s
′,#, s′′, R) ∈ Uk
′′
i′′ it holds that
1
i
≤ 1
i′
+ 1
i′′
.
For the sake of convenience, when a node s does not belong to any Uki , we as-
sume s ∈ U∞∞ . Then, we just define
1
∞
= 0. The result follows from this fact and
theorem 7. The proof is by induction on i.
Base Case: For i = 1, we perform an induction on j. Let j = 2 and suppose
that (s,#, s′′, R) ∈ U21 . This means that we have a transition (s,#, s
′′, R)
σ
−→
(w, σt, w′′, V ), where t ∈ {1, 2}, that cannot be matched by the Verifier. In case
that t = 1, then this play is a transition (s,#, s′′, R)
σt
−→ (w, σt, s′′, V ) from A.
Now, let (s,#, s′, R) and (s′,#, s′′, R) be a pair of nodes of A and A′, respec-
tively. By definition, we have a transition (s,#, s′, R)
σ
−→ (w,#, s′, R) in QAM ,A′ .
In case that the Verifier cannot match this play in that game we have that
(s,#, s′, R) ∈ U21 . This finishes the proof since 1 ≤ 1+k
′′, regardless of the value
of k′′. Otherwise, we have a play by the refuter (w,#, s′, R)
σ1
−→ (w, σ1, w′, V )
and we also have a transition (s′,#, s′′, R)
σ
−→ (w′, σ, s′′, V ). But, this cannot
be matched by our initial assumption, that is, (s′,#, s′′, R) ∈ U21 . This final-
izes the base case for j. For t = 2, the reasoning is similar using the transi-
tions of A′′. Now, for the inductive case of the second induction consider j > 2
and i = 1, that is, (s,#, s′′, R) ∈ U j1 . This means that we have a transition
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(s,#, s′′, R)
σt
−→ (w, σt, w′′, V ) with t ∈ {1, 2}. Consider now any pairs of states
(s,#, s′, R) in QA,A′ and (s′,#, s′′, R) in QA′,A′′ . In case of t = 1, then we have
a transition (s,#, s′′, R)
σ1
−→ (w, σ1, s′′, V ) where post((w, σ1, s′′, V )) ⊆
⋃k≤j U j1 .
By definition of game QAM ,A′ , we have a transition (s,#, s
′, R)
σ
−→ (w, σ, s′, V ).
In case that it cannot be matched, then the result follows. Otherwise, we have
transitions (w, σ, s′, V )
σ
−→ (w,#, w′, R) for w′ ∈ S′. Therefore, there must be
also a transition (s′,#, s′′, R)
σ
−→ (w′, σ, s′′, V ). Similarly, in case that this can-
not be matched we have (s′,#, s′′, R) ∈ U21 and the proof finishes. In other case,
we have a collection of transitions (w′, σ, s′′, V ) −→ (w′,#, w′′, R) for w′′ ∈ S′′.
Note that for any of these pairs (w,#, w′, R) and (w′,#, w′′, R), we have that
(s,#, s′′, R)
σ
−→ (w, σ1, s′′, V )
σ
−→ (w,#, w′′, R). Then, (w,#, w′′, R) ∈ U j−21 and
by inductive hypothesis for all of these pairs we have (w,#, w′, R) ∈ U j
′
1 and
(w′,#, w′′, R) ∈ U j
′′
1 , Now, taking k
′ as the maximum of all these j′ and k′′ as the
maximum of all these j′′, we obtain that (w, σ, s′, V ) ∈ Uk
′+1
1 and (w
′, σ, s′′, V ) ∈
Uk
′′+1
1 . This implies that (s, σ, s
′, V ) ∈ Uk
′+2
1 and (s
′, σ, s′′, V ) ∈ Uk
′′+2
1 , which
finishes the proof.
Inductive Case: For i > 1 the proof is as follows. Assume that (s,#, s′′, R) ∈
U ji . Since 1 < i < j, we have a transition (s,#, s
′′, R)
σt
−→ (w, σt, w′′, V ).
In case that σt = F 2 for some F ∈ F ′′, then we must have a transition
(s, F 2, w′′, V )
M
−→ (s,#, w′′, R) and (s,#, w′′, R) ∈ U j−2i−1 . On the other hand,
in game QA′,A′′ we must have a transition (s′,#, s′′, R)
F
−→ (s′, F 2, w′′, V ) by
definition. In case that F ∈ F ′, then F ∈ Σ′. On the contrary, if it cannot be
matched, then the result follows. Otherwise, we have a collection of transitions
(s′, F 2, w′′, V )
F
−→ (w′,#, w′′, R). So, in game QA,A′ we have at least an edge
(s,#, s′, R)
F
−→ (s, F 2, w′, V ). By the initial assumption, this can be masked, and
then there is a transition (s, F 2, w′, V )
M
−→ (s,#, w′, R). By induction, we have
(s,#, w′, R) ∈ U j
′
i′ and (w
′,#, w′′, R) ∈ U j
′′
i′′ such that
1
i−1 ≤
1
i′
+ 1
i′′
. Note
that (s, F 2, w′, V ) ∈ U j
′−1
i′−1 , since we have a unique (masking) transition from
(s, F 2, V, w′). Now, let us define k′′ = max{i′′ | for all states (s′,#, w′′, V ) ∈
U j
′′
i′′ }. Then, (s
′, F 2, s′′, V ) ∈ Uk
′′
i′′ and we have that (s,#, s
′, R) ∈ U j
′
i′+1 and
(s′,#, s′′, V ) ∈ Uk
′′
i′′ with
1
i
≤ 1
i′+1 +
1
i′′
by definition of sets U ’s. This finishes
the proof for this case. In case that σt 6= F 2, the proof proceeds by induction on
j as the second induction in the base case.
The proof for δWm is similar to the δm but using Q
W
AM ,A′
instead of QAM ,A′ and
by theorem 2.
⋄
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C Models for Case Studies
In this section we provide models for some instances of the case studies presented
in Section 4, these and models for other instances can be found on the tool
repository.
C.1 Memory Cell (3 bits)
Here we have a basic model for a 3 bit redundancy memory cell, there is a single
process Memory with actions for reading and writing a value. The process may
fail by flipping one or more bits.
Proces s Memory {
w: BOOL; // the l a s t value written ,
r : BOOL; // the value we can read from the memory
c0 : BOOL; // the f i r s t b i t
c1 : BOOL; // the second b i t
c2 : BOOL; // the th i rd b i t
I n i t i a l : w && c0 && c1 && c2 && r ;
Normative : ( c0==c1 ) && ( c1==c2 ) && ( c0==c2 ) && w==r ;
[ wr i te ] true −> w=!w, c0=!c0 , c1=!c1 , c2=!c2 , r =! r ;
[ read0 ] ! r −> r = r ;
[ read1 ] r −> r = r ;
[ f a i l 1 ] f au l t y true −> c0=!c0 , r =(! c0&&c1 ) | | ( c1&&c2 ) | | ( ! c0&&c2 ) ;
[ f a i l 2 ] f au l t y true −> c1=!c1 , r =(c0&&!c1 ) | | ( ! c1&&c2 ) | | ( c0&&c2 ) ;
[ f a i l 3 ] f au l t y true −> c2=!c2 , r =(c0&&c1 ) | | ( c1&&!c2 ) | | ( c0&&!c2 ) ;
}
Main (){
m1: Memory ;
run m1( ) ;
}
C.2 N-Modular Redundancy (3 modules)
This is a model for 3-Modular Redundancy, there are three processes: Mod-
ule,Voter and Environment. Modules can fail by flipping the input signal, The
Voter outputs the majority value of the signals received, and the Environment
can reset the input to 0 or 1.
Global i0 , i1 , i 2 :BOOL; // inputs f o r each module
Proces s Module ( out :BOOL) {
I n i t i a l : ! i 0 && ! i 1 && ! i 2 ;
Normative : true ;
[ f a i l ] f au l ty true −> out = ! out ;
}
Proces s Voter{
I n i t i a l : ! i 0 && ! i 1 && ! i 2 ;
Normative : true ;
[ vote ] ( i 0&&i1 ) | | ( i 1&&i2 ) | | ( i 0&&i2 ) −> i 0 = i0 ; // i f major i ty then skip
}
Proces s Environment {
I n i t i a l : ! i 0 && ! i 1 && ! i 2 ;
Normative : true ;
[ input0 ] true −> i 0 = f a l s e , i 1 = f a l s e , i 2 = f a l s e ;
[ input1 ] true −> i 0 = true , i 1 = true , i 2 = true ;
}
Main (){
m0: Module ;
m1: Module ;
m2: Module ;
v0 : Voter ;
e0 : Environment ;
run m0( i 0 ) ;
run m1( i 1 ) ;
run m2( i 2 ) ;
run v0 ( ) ;
run e0 ( ) ;
}
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C.3 Byzantine Agreement (4 generals)
This is a model for Byzantine Agreement with 4 generals, we differentiate the
commander as a separate process Commander, and the other generals are in-
stances of a Lieutenant process. In this case, there are two rounds of messages,
the first one is an order from the commander to the lieutenants of attack or
retreat, then comes the second round which involves a forward of the comman-
der order from each lieutenant to all other lieutenants. Lieutenants may become
traitors at any moment and send conflicted messages.
Global g1g2A , g1g3A , g1g4A : BOOL; //Commander( g1 ) attack messages
Global g2g3A , g2g4A : BOOL; // Lieutenant1 ( g2 ) attack messages
Global g3g2A , g3g4A : BOOL; // Lieutenant2 ( g3 ) attack messages
Global g4g2A , g4g3A : BOOL; // Lieutenant3 ( g4 ) attack messages
Global g1g2R , g1g3R , g1g4R : BOOL; //Commander( g1 ) r e t r e a t messages
Global g2g3R , g2g4R : BOOL; // Lieutenant1 ( g2 ) r e t r e a t messages
Global g3g2R , g3g4R : BOOL; // Lieutenant2 ( g3 ) r e t r e a t messages
Global g4g2R , g4g3R : BOOL; // Lieutenant3 ( g4 ) r e t r e a t messages
Global A2 ,A3,A4 : BOOL; //The Attack de c i s i on of each l i e u t e nan t
Global R2 ,R3 ,R4 : BOOL; //The Retreat dec i s i on of each l i e u t e nan t
Proces s Commander{
s0 , s1 : BOOL;
I n i t i a l : s0 && ! s1 ;
Normative : true ;
[ sA ] s0 −> g1g2A = true , g1g3A = true , g1g4A = true , s0= fa l s e , s1=true ;
[ sR ] s0 −> g1g2R = true , g1g3R = true , g1g4R = true , s0= fa l s e , s1=true ;
}
Proces s Lieutenant ( attack : BOOL, r e t r e a t : BOOL, fw1A : BOOL, fw2A :BOOL, fw1R :BOOL,
fw2R :BOOL, a1 :BOOL, a2 :BOOL, r1 :BOOL, r2 :BOOL, dA:BOOL, dR:BOOL){
// PARAMS: attack : attack order from commander , fw1A and fw2A : messages sent
// to other l i eu t enan t s , a1 and a2 : messages r e c e i ved from other l i eu t enan t s ,
// dA: dec ide to attack , the r e s t o f params are s im i l a r but with r e t r e a t
s0 , s1 , s2 , i sBe t raye r : BOOL;
I n i t i a l : s0 && ! s1 && ! s2 && ! i sBe t raye r ;
Normative : true ;
[ fA ] s0 && attack && ! i sBe t r ay e r −> fw1A = true , fw2A= true , s0 = f a l s e ,
s1 = true ;
[ fR ] s0 && r e t r e a t && ! i sBe t ray e r −> fw1R = true , fw2R = true , s0 = fa l s e ,
s1 = true ;
[ fA ] s0 && attack && isBet r aye r −> fw1R = true , fw2R= true , s0 = f a l s e ,
s1 = true ;
[ fR ] s0 && r e t r e a t && isBet r ay e r −> fw1A = true , fw2A= true , s0 = f a l s e ,
s1 = true ;
[ Betray ] f au l t y s0 && ! i sBe t ray e r −> i sB e t raye r = true ;
[ Attack ] s1 && ! i sBe t raye r && (( attack && a1 ) | | ( attack && a2 ) | | ( a1 && a2 ) )
−> s1 = fa l s e , s2 = true , dA = true ;
[ Retreat ] s1 && ! i sBe t raye r && (( r e t r ea t && r1 ) | | ( r e t r e a t && r2 ) | | ( r1 && r2 ) )
−> s1 = fa l s e , s2 = true , dR = true ;
}
Main (){
g1 :Commander ;
g2 : Lieutenant ;
g3 : Lieutenant ;
g4 : Lieutenant ;
run g1 ( ) ;
run g2 ( g1g2A , g1g2R , g2g3A , g2g4A , g2g3R , g2g4R , g3g2A , g4g2A , g3g2R , g4g2R ,A2 ,R2 ) ;
run g3 ( g1g3A , g1g3R , g3g2A , g3g4A , g3g2R , g3g4R , g2g3A , g4g3A , g2g3R , g4g3R ,A3 ,R3 ) ;
run g4 ( g1g4A , g1g4R , g4g3A , g4g2A , g4g3R , g4g2R , g2g4A , g3g4A , g2g4R , g3g4R ,A4 ,R4 ) ;
}
C.4 Dining Philosophers (3 philosophers)
Here we show a model for the Dining Philosophers in the case of 3 philosophers,
2 of which take the right fork first and the other takes the left one first, these
are modeled as processes EvenPhil and OddPhil respectively. We incorporate a
faulty behaviour on EvenPhil that makes it behave as OddPhil, i.e takes the left
fork first.
Measuring Masking Fault-Tolerance 25
// ! s0 ! s1 == th ink ing
// ! s0s1 == hungry
// s0 ! s1 == eat ing
Global fork0 , fork1 , f ork2 :BOOL;
Proces s OddPhil ( forkL :BOOL, forkR :BOOL){
s0 , s1 : BOOL;
hasL , hasR : BOOL;
I n i t i a l : ! s0 && ! s1 && ! hasL && ! hasR && forkR && forkL ;
Normative : ! ( hasR && ! hasL ) ;
[ hungry ] ! s0 && ! s1 −> s1 = true ;
[ g e tLe f t ] ! s0 && s1 && forkL && ! hasL && ! hasR −> forkL=fa l s e , hasL=true ;
[ getRight ] ! s0 && s1 && hasL && forkR && ! hasR −> forkR = fa l s e , hasR=true ;
[ e a t ing ] ! s0 && s1 && hasL && hasR −> s1 = f a l s e , s0 = true ;
[ th ink ing ] s0 && ! s1 −> s0 = fa l s e , forkL=true , forkR=true , hasR=f a l s e ,
hasL=f a l s e ;
}
Proces s EvenPhil ( forkL :BOOL, forkR :BOOL){
s0 , s1 : BOOL;
hasL , hasR : BOOL;
I n i t i a l : ! s0 && ! s1 && ! hasL && ! hasR && forkR && forkL ;
Normative : ! ( hasL && ! hasR ) ;
[ hungry ] ! s0 && ! s1 −> s1 = true ;
[ getRight ] ! s0 && s1 && forkR && ! hasL && ! hasR −> forkR=fa l s e , hasR=true ;
[ g e tLe f t ] ! s0 && s1 && hasR && forkL && ! hasL −> forkL = fa l s e , hasL=true ;
[ e a t ing ] ! s0 && s1 && hasL && hasR −> s1 = f a l s e , s0 = true ;
[ th ink ing ] s0 && ! s1 −> s0 = fa l s e , forkL=true , forkR=true , hasR=f a l s e ,
hasL=f a l s e ;
[ g e tLe f t ] f au l t y ! s0 && s1 && ! hasR && forkL && ! hasL −> forkL = f a l s e ,
hasL=true ;
}
Main (){
phi l 1 : OddPhil ;
ph i l 2 : EvenPhil ;
ph i l 3 : EvenPhil ;
run ph i l 1 ( fork2 , fork0 ) ;
run ph i l 2 ( fork0 , fork1 ) ;
run ph i l 3 ( fork1 , fork2 ) ;
}
C.5 Bounded Retransmission Protocol (1 chunk, 3 retransmissions)
The BRP protocol sends a file in a number of chunks, but allows only a bounded
number of retransmissions of each chunk, here we model an instance of this
problem with 3 retransmissions on a single chunk. There are two processes, the
Sender and the Receiver, the former has a set of internal actions that represent
the case when a message is lost (i.e. a fault has occurred) and has to retrasmit
it.
// N==1 number of chunks
// MAX==3 number o f r e t r an sm i s s i on s
Global f s , l s , bs : BOOL;
Global flagK , f l agL : BOOL;
Proces s Sender {
s0 , s1 , s2 : BOOL; // s ta t e va r i a b l e s i d l e (000 ) , nextframe (001) , waitack (010) ,
// re t ransmi t (011) , s u cce s s (100) , e r ro r (101 ) , waitsync (110)
srep0 , s rep1 : BOOL; // s rep va r i a b l e s bottom (00 ) , nok (01 ) , dk (10) , ok (11)
sab : BOOL;
rt0 , r t1 : BOOL; // f i r s t a t t empt (00 ) , r e t ransmis s i on1 (01 ) , r e t ran smis s i on2 (10 ) ,
// r e t ran smis s i on3 (11)
I n i t i a l : ! s0 && ! s1 && ! s2 && ! s rep0 && ! s rep1 && ! bs && ! sab && ! f s && ! l s &&
! r t0 && ! r t1 && ! flagK && ! f l agL ;
Normative : true ;
// i d l e
[ NewFile ] ! s0 && ! s1 && ! s2 −> s2 = true , s rep0 = fa l s e , s rep1 = f a l s e ;
// next frame
[ sendChunk ] ! s0 && ! s1 && s2 && ! flagK −> s1 = true , s2 = fa l s e , f s = true ,
l s = true , bs = sab , r t0 = fa l s e , r t1 = fa l s e , f lagK = true ;
//wait ack
[ rece iveAck ] ! s0 && s1 && ! s2 && ! flagK && f lagL −> s0 = true , s1 = fa l s e ,
sab = ! sab , f l agL = f a l s e ;
[TOMsg] f au l t y ! s0 && s1 && ! s2 && flagK −> s2 = true , f lagK = f a l s e ;
// r et ran smi t
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[ sendChunk ] i n t e r na l ! s0 && s1 && s2 && ! r t0 && ! rt1 && ! flagK −> s2 = fa l s e ,
f s = true , l s = true ,
bs = sab , r t1 = true , f lagK = true ;
[ sendChunk ] i n t e r na l ! s0 && s1 && s2 && ! r t0 && rt1 && ! flagK −> s2 = fa l s e ,
f s = true , l s = true ,
bs = sab , r t0 = true , r t1 = fa l s e , f lagK = true ;
[ sendChunk ] i n t e r na l ! s0 && s1 && s2 && rt0 && ! rt1 && ! flagK −> s2 = fa l s e ,
f s = true , l s = true ,
bs = sab , r t1 = true , f lagK = true ;
[ e r r o r ] i n t e r n a l ! s0 && s1 && s2 && rt0 && rt1 −> s0 = true , s1 = fa l s e ,
s rep0 = fa l s e , s rep1 = true ;
[ e r r o r ] i n t e r n a l ! s0 && s1 && s2 && rt0 && rt1 −> s0 = true , s1 = fa l s e ,
s rep0 = true , s rep1 = f a l s e ;
// succe s s
[ su cce s s ] s0 && ! s1 && ! s2 −> s0 = fa l s e , s rep0 = true , s rep1 = true ;
// e r r o r
[ r e s t a r t ] s0 && ! s1 && s2 −> s0 = f a l s e , s2 = f a l s e ;
}
Proces s Rece iver {
r0 , r1 , r2 : BOOL; // n ew f i l e (000 ) , f s t s a f e (001) , f r amerece ived (010) ,
// f ramereported (011 ) , i d l e (100) , f i n i s h (101)
rrep0 , rrep1 , rrep2 : BOOL; // bottom (000 ) , f s t (001 ) , inc (010 ) , ok (011) , nok (100)
f r , l r , br , rab , recv : BOOL;
I n i t i a l : ! r0 && ! r1 && ! r2 && ! rrep0 && ! rrep1 && ! rrep2 && ! f r && ! l r && ! br &&
! rab && ! recv && ! f s && ! l s && ! bs && ! flagK && ! f l agL ;
Normative : true ;
// new f i l e
[ rece iveF i rs tChunk ] ! r0 && ! r1 && ! r2 && flagK && ! f l agL −> r2 = true , f r = fs ,
l r = l s , br = bs , recv = true , f lagK = f a l s e ;
// f s t s a f e f r ame
[ e ] ! r0 && ! r1 && r2 && ! f l agL −> r1 = true , r2 = fa l s e , rab = br ;
// f rame rece ived
[ s e t I nd i c a t i on ] ! r0 && r1 && ! r2 && rab==br && f r && ! l r && ! flagL−> r2 = true ,
rrep0 = fa l s e , rrep1 = f a l s e , rrep2 = true ;
[ s e t I nd i c a t i on ] ! r0 && r1 && ! r2 && rab==br && ! f r && ! l r && ! f l agL −> r2 = true ,
rrep0 = fa l s e , rrep1 = true , rrep2 = f a l s e ;
[ s e t I nd i c a t i on ] ! r0 && r1 && ! r2 && rab==br && ! f r && l r && ! f l agL −> r2 = true ,
rrep0 = fa l s e , rrep1 = true , rrep2 = true ;
[ sendAck ] ! r0 && r1 && ! r2 && ! ( rab==br ) && ! f l agL −> r0 = true , r1 = fa l s e ,
f l agL = true ;
// f rame report ed
[ sendAck ] ! r0 && r1 && r2 && ! f l agL && ! l r −> r0 = true , r1 = f a l s e , r2 = f a l s e ,
rab = ! rab , f l agL = true ;
[ sendAck ] ! r0 && r1 && r2 && ! f l agL && l r −> r0 = true , r1 = fa l s e , r2 = true ,
rab = ! rab , f l agL = true ;
// i d l e
[ receiveChunk ] r0 && ! r1 && ! r2 && flagK && ! f l agL −> r0 = fa l s e , r1 = true ,
f r = fs , l r = l s , br = bs ,
recv = true , f lagK = f a l s e ;
// f i n i s h
[ r e s t a r t ] r0 && ! r1 && r2 −> r1 = f a l s e , r2 = f a l s e ;
}
Main (){
s : Sender ;
r : Rece iver ;
run s ( ) ;
run r ( ) ;
}
